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AN ANALYSIS OF SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
UNDER SPECIAL STATUTES IN VIRGINIA
PHILIP G. DENMAN
Virginia can be justly proud of her leadership in the adoption
of the summary proceeding as a method of litigation, but this ex-
tremely valuable field of the law appears to have long suffered an
uncalled-for neglect. It is never enough to be satisfied with what was
once rapidly acceptable and forward-looking law, since the passage
of years and changing conditions often impair and sometimes com-
pletely destroy the efficiency of the best of statutes. Thus, the basic
purpose of this paper is to present for re-examination this im-
portant section of the Virginia law, to analyze and criticise in the
light of present day conditions and, with all deference, to submit
suggestions for possible legislative simplification and clarification,
with the hoped-for end-product being statutes which are clear in
context and easy in application.
A summary proceeding has been defined as "a form of trial in
which the ancient established course of legal proceedings is dis-
regarded."1 It is, then, any proceeding by which an existing contro-
versy is settled or case disposed of in a prompt and simple manner,
and as such fits admirably into the modem trend of the law in
moving steadily away from the time honored form of trial with its
complicated and oft times antiquated pleadings. The resultant ben-
efits of such simplification are patent. First, any defense which
might be presented solely for purposes of delay is discouraged; sec-
ond, it gives the plaintiff a speedy judgment in the average case,
with a consequent lowering of costs to all parties involved; and
third, it encourages aggrieved persons, who might ordinarily choose
otherwise, to resort to the courts, knowing they will get rapid satis-
faction.2
The adoption of the first summary proceeding in Virginia can
be traced to 1732, when statutes appeared providing for summary
judgment on motion against sheriffs and other officers failing to
I Yoder v. Corn., 107 Va. 823, 57 S.E. 581 (1908), citing Brown v. Epps, 91
Va. 726, 21 S.E. 119, 27 L.R.A. 676 (1895)
2 For discussion see Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 Yale
L.Rev. 423 (1929), citing Am.Jur.Soc. Bul. XIV (1919) 100.
pay over public money to the proper recipient.8 During the subse-
quent one hundred and seventeen years the remedy was extended to
other procedures, and by 1849 was available to "any persons en-
titled to recover by action on a contract. '" Thereafter the expan-
sion continued steadily, reaching its broadest form in 1919 when the
remedy was extended to embrace all actions at law.5 The evolution
was completed by adoption of Rule 3:1.6
By Rule 3:3 an action shall be commenced by filing in the
clerk's office a motion for judgment. By Rule 3:1 the notice of
motion procedure is applied "to all civil actions at law in a court of
record seeking a judgment in personam for money only (except
where a tax refund is sought), actions for establishment of bound-
aries, ejectment, unlawful detainer, detinue and declaratory judg-
ments (when at law), including cases appealed or removed to such
courts from inferior courts whenever applicable to such cases. In
matters not covered by these Rules, the established practices are
continued. ' 7
The working of Rule 3:1 therefore contemplates the coverage
of all actions at law, but the summary proceedings here considered
are for the most part excepted from the coverage of Rule 3: 1, being
governed by special statutes. The reason for such special treatment
may seem questionable in the face of the existence of a catch-all rule
such as Rule 3:1. The answer seems to be for the most part his-
torical, since the great majority of the summary proceedings are
those which were originally adopted as such before the extension
3 Acts of May, 1732, Ch. 10, Section 8, 4 Va.Stat.(Hening) 352.
4 Report of Revisers cited in Wilson v. Dawson, 96 Va. 687 (1899) "
seeing that this mode of proceeding has worked well in the cases in
which it has been heretofore allowed, it seems to us advisable to extend
it to all cases in which a person is now entitled to recover money by
action on a contract."
5 Va. Code Ann. (1919) Title 60, §6043; Va. Code Ann. (1950), Title 8,
§ 8-717. "Any person entitled to maintain an action at law in lieu of
such action at law, may proceed by motion before any court which
would have jurisdiction of such action . . ." For reasons motivating
this final expansion see Chandler v. Balt.R.Co., 125 Va. 63, 99 S.E. 194
(1919); Whitley v. Booker Brick Co., 113 Va. 434, 74 S.E. 146 (1912);
Curtis v. Peebles, 161 Va. 780, 172 S.E. 257 (1934); Shearin v. Va.
Elec. etc. Co., 182 Va. 573, 29 S.E.2d 841 (1944); Preston v. Salem
Imp. Co., 91 Va. 583, 22 S.E. 486 (1895).
6 See 16 V.L.Reg. Editorial favoring the reduction of the whole system of
pleading to a single notice stating the object of the unit.
7 Rule 3: 1, Rules of Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Va. Code 1950.
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of the summary remedy to all actions at law. It would seem at first
glance quite possible to include all these proceedings under Rule 3:1
and as a result eliminate some 59 statutes from the Code. Whether
this would be efficacious is a question which will not be answered
here since it seems apparent that these proceedings, with their
roots buried so deeply in history, would not be so easily moved. It
must be conceded that iron clad customs, stemming from long ac-
cepted practice, often present an insuperable barrier to change, even
when opposed by the dictates of logic. Such is the case here.
For summary proceedings no formal pleadings are required.8
"A proceeding by motion under Code Va. is intended to furnish a
simpler, more expedient and less offensive remedy for the collection
of debts. Hence we find that the uniform course of decision in this
State has been to view with more leniency and to allow greater
laxity in the pleadings in that form of procedure."9
As to the notice requirement, §8-140.1 gives the general pro-
vision: "Except as provided in Part Three of the Rules of Court in
any case wherein there may be judgment or decrees for money on
motion, such motion shall be after ten days notice unless some other
time be specified in the section or statute giving such motion."
GENERAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. The individual summary proceedings are at present found
at only one location in the Code-each under the title and chapter
to which the proceeding itself immediately applies. For example,
the special statute governing proceedings against officers failing to
make a return are found only in Title 15, those governing proceed-
ing against delinquent treasurers of sureties in Title 58, and those
governing recovery of fines in Title 19, etc. There seems to be no
apparent connection or coordination between an individual statute
at its individual location and the other special statutes in other parts
of the Code, although the fact is apparent that all are closely re-
8 Hall v. Ratcliff, 93 Va. 327, 24 S.E. 1011 (1896), citing Bunch's Ex'r. v.
Fluvanna Co., 86 Va. 452, 10 S.E. 532 (1890).
9 Carr v Meade's Ex'r., 77 Va. 142 (1883). "Any notice, however informal,
which informs the defendant of the nature and object of the motion is
sufficient." And see also Board of Supervisors v. Lunn, 27 Gratt. (68
Va.) 608 (1876); Preston v. Salem Imp. Co., 91 Va. 583, 22 S.E. 486
(1895); Montieth v. Com., 15 Gratt. (56 Va.) 172 (1859).
lated in principle. There is no place where a person may turn to
find a definitive list of all the summary proceedings governed by
special statutes, although the value of such a list is immediately
obvious, at least to one who has had the misfortune of attempting to
track down each proceeding to its final resting place. Finally, and
most basic of all, there is no reference to summary proceedings in
the Code General Index. Thus, the researcher is faced with an
exasperating and time consuming task for which no justification is
apparent, and which could be remedied quite easily. It seems
advisable, therefore, that there should be entered in the Code a
complete list of all summary procedings with their accompanying
special statutes, such a list to incorporate cross references to the
sections at which the proceedings are presently individually located,
and corresponding cross references at the individual location to the
list, and this to be indexed.'0
II. In §8-140.1 there is set forth a uniform time provision
for notice governing the summary proceedings. However, with
this admirable uniformity there arises a resulting difficulty-
namely, an immediate need for explanation of the meaning of the
word "motion" employed in the statute. It has been said that: "A
motion is necessarily to a great extent a proceeding of an informal
character. It is an application ore tenus addressed to the court by
counsel."'" When §8-140.1 is read for the first time, however, it
becomes questionable whether the term "motion" represents a con-
tracted reference to the notice of motion for judgment procedure
of Rule 3:3, or indicates some type of simplified procedure. The
latter is, of course, the correct view, but confusion on the point is
difficult to avoid. Moreover, upon further study of the various sum-
mary proceedings one finds that individually they are identified by
a variety of names, among these being: "action", "motion", "peti-
tion", "suit", "warrant", and "application." Such a disparity of
terms is testimony to past legislative genius, but is extremely un-
welcome to the person attempting to deal with the summary pro-
ceedings as a group. Obviously, none of these terms are intended to
be construed as having the same meaning, and, as a result, the
lawyer, in his search for the absolute is necessarily, albeit unwillingly,
driven to extensive investigation and definition. Therefore, in order
that any type of recommendation for revision or simplification may
10 For proposed list, see Appendix.
11 Kendrick v. Whitney, 28 Gratt. (69 Va.) 646 (1877).
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be made herein, a closer examination of the meaning and use of
these terms, and a resulting judgment upon the advisability of their
retention or rejection becomes necessary.
Motion:12 A majority of the special statutes incorporate the
term 'motion' to identify the proceeding. We have already noted in
considering §8-140.1 that the term as used in the summary proceed-
ing is in the main descriptive of a simplified procedure in contra-
distinction to the comparatively formal notice of motion for judg-
ment procedure of Rule 3:3. Some of the proceedings, however,
employ the term as a motion under Rule 3:2. Rule 3:2 states in
effect that rule days are abolished and the procedure will be by
notice of motion for judgment. With respect to this situation the
question of whether to retain the summary procedure when the
statute obviously falls within the coverage of Rule 3:1 again arises.
Once more the answer is found in the past, as discussed heretofore.
Whatever the reason may be it is obvious that the word "motion"
as used in the greater part of the statutes is capable of being de-
fined in several different ways. 3
Action:14 An action indicates jurisdiction at law,' 5 and has
been defined as "an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by
12 Proceedings against county treasurers for failure to pay warrant (§58-
928) ; Proceedings against delinquent treasurers and sureties (§58-976);
Proceeding against officer for money due from him (§ 15-520); Pro-
ceeding by client against attorney for failure to pay on demand money
received for the client (§54-46); Proceeding by officer against deputy
for default or misconduct in office (§ 15-521); Proceeding by surety
against principal for money paid (§49-27); Recovery of damages sus-
tained for property withheld during appeal in detinue action (§8-595) ;
Recovery of fines (§§ 19-298 through 19-302); Recovery on bonds taken
or given by officers (§8-140.2).
"3 For a prime example of such confusion see Recovery of Debts Due the
State (§§8-758 through 8-788), which statutes seem to denote a sum-
mary proceeding in favor of the State, especially when taken in context
with the other proceedings considered herein. The position taken with
reference to these statutes by the Office of the Comptroller, however,
is one of construing them as not giving the State any procedure for
the recovery of debts due the State that is not available to individuals
or business firms, with the exception of when there are special provi-
sions available for the levy of liens. This would then bring this pro-
ceeding under the coverage of Rule 3:1.
14 Recovery of Debts Due the State (§§8-758 through 8-788) ; Recovery of
Fines (§§19-299 through 19-302); Recovery on Bonds Taken or Given
by Officer (§8-140.2); Note, 10 Va.L.Rev. 166 (1923-24).
"5 Lawhead v. Board of Trustees, 115 W.Va. 475, 176 S.E. 860 (1934).
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or prose-
cution of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the pun-
ishment of a public offense."1 But we have seen that the summary
proceedings herein considered are certainly not "ordinary proceed-
ings," being excepted from the coverage of Rule 3:1, which governs
all actions at law. The terms "action at law" and "action" imme-
diately bring to mind the usual type of legal proceeding with its at-
tendant formalities and technicalities, while summary proceedings,
by their very name, denote a radically different type altogether.
There is then a distinct difference between "action" as applied
under Rule 3:1 and any term employed to adequately describe a
method of summary procedure. The retention of the term can ap-
parently be justified upon the grounds that it is a hangover from
the days when there were actions for various counts, and is so pre-
served in the statutes as a concession to the older procedures.
Rule:17 A small number of the statutes employ the phrase
... the clerk.., shall issue a rule... etc.... ." Any person who
has attempted to determine the actual basis and meaning of this
phrase in Virginia procedure will recognize it as an old enemy
and approach it again with a feeling approximating morbid fasci-
nation. In the volumes which constitute recognized authority on
procedure,' 8 much is said about rule days-nothing is said about
the rule itself. Just what is a rule, and what exactly are the require-
ments for its issuance? Has it any relation to the Rules of Court;
has it any weight at all since, by Rule 3:2, rule days are expressly
abolished? Is any particular type of request required, and finally,
are there any statutes governing the procedure of issuance? More
such questions arise when the proceeding being dealt with is one
in equity (§8-664 through §8-667), 19 since by Rule 2:1, rule days
have been abolished in equity in some, but not all, situations.
When all these questions are finally answered, it appears that
16 Missionary Society v. Ely, 56 Ohio St. 405, 47 N.E. 537 (1897).
'7 Proceeding against an Officer Failing to Make a Return (§§15-515, 15-
516); Proceeding against Receivers, Commissioners, Sureties Appointed
by or Acting under the Authority of the Court, and also, Against a
Purchaser at a Judicial Sale and his Surety (§§8-664 through 8-667).
Is Barton's Chancery Practice, 3rd Ed. (1926); Burke, Common Law &
Statutory Pleading and Practice, 4th Ed. (1952); Lile's Equity Pleading
and Practice. 3rd Ed. (1952). Michie's Jurisprudence.
29 Rush v. Dickinson County Bank, 128 Va. 114, 104 S.E. 700 (1920), ap-
plied in Ferebee v. Todd, 154 Va. 293 153 S.E. 705 (1930).
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when the court issues a rule against the person named in the
statute, it does nothing more than order him to appear before the
court and show cause why a certain thing should not be done, (i.e.,
fine levied against him). What the researcher is faced with then is
a vague method employed to implement an extremely simple pro-
cedure. The reason again is found in established custom, but there
are times, and this is one such time, when even history cannot
justify needless obscurity.
Petition:20 "The word "petition" is usually used in judicial pro-
ceedings to describe an application in writing in contradistinction
to a motion which may be viva voce."2 ' "The principal distinction
between motions and petitions lies in the fact that motions, though
usually made in writing, may sometimes be made orally while a
petition is always in writing. So, also, motions can usually be made
only by a party to the record, while petitions may in some cases
be presented by persons not parties." 22 "The term "petition," as re-
lated to equity procedure, connotes an application in writing ad-
dressed to a court or judge, stating facts and circumstances relied
upon as a cause for judicial action, and containing a prayer for
relief." 23
"Petition" then, by definition, is applicable to both law and
equity, and further investigation is therefore necessitated. It has
been held that: "It is immaterial whether the proceeding is to be
regarded as one in law or equity, since the statute (§8-752) will be
liberally construed. ' 24 The term also seems to anticipate antag-
onistic pleadings, and in fact is so construed in most other states.25
If such is the case, it would appear that "petition" means exactly
the same as the motion for judgment procedure under Rule 3:1.
20 Recovery of Claims against the State (§§8-752 through 8-757, 2-103);
(Further Relief Based on a Declaratory Judgment, §8-581).
21 Bergen v. Jones, 4 Metc. (45 Mass.) 371 (1842).
22 Gibb v. Ewing, 94 Fla. 236, 113 So. 730 (1927).
23 Nield v. Nield, 126 W. Va. 430, 28 S.E. 2d 825 (1944).
24 Stuart v. Smith Courtney Co., 123 Va. 231, 96 S.E. 241, 125 A.L.R.
68 (1918), citing Green v. Marye, Auditor, 112 Va. 352, 71 S.E. 555
(1911).
25 Murphy v. Ferguson-McElhaney Motor Co., 40 Ga. App. 847, 151 S.E.
663 (1930); Hudson's Administratrix v. Collins, 239 Ky. 131, 38 S.W.
2d. 975 (1931); State ex. rel. Rakowsky v. Bates, 286 S.W. 420
(1926); Cowley-Lantner Lumber Co. v. fDow, 150 Okla. 150, 300 P.
781 (1931).
Again we have the problem of inclusion under Rule 3:1 or reten-
tion as a summary proceeding, which point has been settled supra
in favor of the latter.
Application:26 The commonly accepted meaning of this term is
that of a request, or a document containing a request. "A putting
to, placing before, preferring a request or petition to or before a
person."2 7'An applicant is defined as "one who files application or
petition, a petitioner."2 8 The term is therefore synonymous with
"petition," the complexities of which have been examined previously.
Again we are presented with two completely different terms in
different statutes denoting exactly the same type of procedure.
Suit, Warrant, Motion for Judgment, etc.: In several of the spe-
cial statutes governing the summary proceedings, two or more
methods of procedure are embodied to be applied in the alter-
native.29 In every case where the terms describing these methods
are not ambiguous and conflicting but are set forth in clear un-
equivocal language as a secondary procedure, such procedure is
to be retained.30
By the foregoing examination of the varied terms used at
present to describe the individual methods of summary procedures,
it becomes apparent that such variances tend only to confuse. Look-
26 Interpleader (§§8-226, 8-227, 16.1-119 through 16.1-122); Proceeding to
Change Name of a Person (§8-577.1).
27 In re Meyer, 100 Misc. Rep. 587, 166 N.Y.S. 505 (1917).
28 Ballantine Law Dictionary, 2d Ed., 1948.
29 Proceeding by Client Against Attorney for Failure to Pay on Demand
Money Received for the Client (§54-46); Procedure is by "warrant",
"motion", or "suite. Recovery of Claims against the State, (§§8-752
through 8-757, 2-103); Procedure is by "petition" or "bill in chan-
cery"; Recovery of Debts Due the State (§§8-758 through 8-788),
Procedure is by "action" or "motion"; Recovery on Bonds Taken or
Given by Officers (§8-140.2); Procedure is by "motion" or "motion for
judgment" under Rule 3: 1.
30 Com. v. Hall, 194 Va. 914, 76 S.E.2d 208 (1953). "The phraseology
plainly indicates that the legislature did not intend that the statutory
remedy should supersede the long established action for breach of con-
dition of a bond, but intended, on the contrary, that such action should
continue as a concurrent, alternative remedy." Fowler v. Tobacco
Growers, Inc., 195 Va. 770, 80 S.E. 2d 554, 10 A.L.R. 782 (1954).
"The remedy of enforcement of the rights determined by the declara-
tory judgment prescribed by this Section (§8-581) is not exclusive. Such
a proceeding is intended to supplement rather than supersede ordinary
causes of action." On this same point, see also Winborne v. Doyle, 190
Va. 867, 59 S.E. 2d 90 (1950).
ing at the overall situation it would seem that a great benefit would
be conferred in the interests of simplification by a provision that,
in every advisable case, these summary proceedings should be iden-
tified by a single uniform term, except where a clear alternative pro-
cedure is set out in the statute. The task of selecting such a term,
however, would be far from an easy one. To create a completely new
term to be applied to these proceedings, some of which have been in
existence for as long as two-hundred and twenty-five years, would
undoubtedly be opposed on the ground that, rather than creating a
more efficient form of proceeding, it would lead to uncalled-for and
unreasonably change in the established customs and practices of
the legal fraternity. Years of continued practice under the old pro-
cedures brings with it concrete associations between term and pro-
ceeding itself. Such ingrained associations militate against any
type of change, but such has been the situation confronting any
attempted simplification of the law. The advisability of alteration
must in every case be weighed against the efficacy of allowing
established practices to remain undisturbed. Theoretical benefits to
be gained from such simplification must be balanced against the
practical efforts of attempting to change custom.
With all these points considered it seems that a compromise
might be reached by adopting the combination term "summary
motion", such term to replace the varied terms presently used to
describe the methods of procedure. The second and final general
recommendation is, therefore, that above the list of summary pro-
ceedings recommended previously there could be entered the
following provision:
In the interest of uniformity, all the summary pro-
ceedings hereinafter listed shall be instituted by a uniform
method of procedure, such procedure to be by an informal
'summary motion' before any court which would have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of proceeding if
brought as an action at law under Rule 3:1, or a suit in
equity, with the qualification that if the governing statute
lists an alternative method of procedure, such alternative
method may be followed, notwithstanding the foregoing
provision. Section 8-140.1 shall he followed with respect to
notice required. Under no circumstances shall this 'sum-
mary motion' be confused with the notice of motion for
judgment procedure set forth by Rule 3:3, or the motion
for summary judgment procedure of Rule 3:20.
With the adoption of these two general recommendations-the
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list of cross-referenced summary proceedings, and the provision for
the procedure to govern the component parts of the list-we are
given a simplified and solid basis on which all the Virginia summary
proceedings may rest.31 If all the special statutes governing the
summary proceedings are made compatible with the foregoing rec-
ommendations, the hoped for result of an easily located, cross-
referenced group of statutes governed by a single informal method
of procedure and drafted in concise, unequivocal terms will be a
reality.
APPENDIX
32
"In the interests of uniformity, all the summary proceedings
hereinafter listed shall be instituted by a uniform method of pro-
cedure, such procedure to be by an informal 'summary motion'
before any court which would have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the proceeding if brought as an action at law under Rule
3:1, or a suit in equity, with the qualification that if the governing
statute lists an alternative method of procedure, such alternative
method may be followed, notwithstanding the foregoing provision.
Section §8-140.1 shall be followed with respect to notice required.
Under no circumstances shall this 'summary motion' be confused
with the notice of motion for judgment procedure set forth by Rule
3:3, or the motion for summary judgment procedure of Rule 3:20."
1. Interpleader, (§§8-226, 8-227, 16.1-119 to 16.1-122).
2. Proceedings against commissioners, receivers of their sure-
ties, appointed by or acting under authority of the court,
and against purchasers at a judicial sale under a decree or
order of such court and their sureties. (§8-664 to 8-667).
3. Proceeding against county treasurers for failure to pay
warrant. (§58-928).
4. Proceedings against delinquent treasurers and sureties.
(§58-976).
5. Proceedings against officer for failure to make a return.
(§§15-515, 15-516).
31 For combined recommendations, see Appendix.
32 In the interest of brevity, the questions of location of these suggested
provisions are not covered herein. These are problems which the
Legislature is better able to resolve.
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6. Proceeding against officer for money due from him.
(§15-520).
7. Proceeding by client against attorney for money received
and not paid. (§54-46). See §26-5 for defenses.
8. Proceeding by officer against deputy for default or miscon-
duct in office. (§15-521).
9. Proceeding by surety against principal for money paid.
(§49-27).
10. Proceeding for recovery of damages for property withheld
during detinue action. (§8-545).
11. Proceeding on certain bonds taken or given by officers.
(§8-140.2).
12. Proceeding to change name of person. (§8-577.1).
13. Proceeding to obtain further relief on declaratory judg-
ments. (§8-581).
14. Recovery of claims against the State. (§§8-752 through
8-757 and §2-193).
15. Recovery of debts due to the State. (§§8-758, 8-788).
16. Recovery of Fines. (§§19-298 through 19-302).
